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Abstract  
It is often assumed that significant differences existed between Great Britain and France 
with regards to their respective styles of colonial administration.  Some researchers have 
asserted that this difference in colonial administration has affected post-colonial 
economic and political development in Africa.  This paper offers some theoretical, 
anecdotal, and econometric evidence questioning the validity of these assumptions.  
This paper also examines some commonly encountered problems associated with 
econometric analyses of African development: namely, the availability and reliability of 
data, and the difficulty in operationalizing and measuring political development in 
Africa.  
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Introduction 
In the literature on colonialism, there is no clear consensus regarding the 
existence, relevance, or impact of colonial style on post-colonial development in Africa.  
Some authors see a definite distinction between British and French colonial styles; 
others see no discernable or significant distinction between the two.  Nonetheless, some 
comparativist authors, who have been exploring broader questions regarding political 
and economic development, have implicitly assumed that this research question had 
been answered.  Migdal (1988), in analyzing the relationship between state strength and 
societal strength, assumes that there was a different style of colonial administration 
between Great Britain and France, which had an impact on both state and societal 
development in post-colonial Africa.  Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), in examining 
presidentialism in Latin America, also make a similar assumption.  According to them, 
“in Africa countries with British colonial heritage (e.g., Botswana) have tended to have 
better democratic records than those without” (23).  The fact that they have cited an 
extreme outlier case as an example of former British colonial success may undermine 
this assertion.  
Even amongst those that believe that there exists a definite distinction between 
British and French colonial styles, there is no consensus regarding the exact nature of 
the effects of this distinction. To some, former British colonies should be expected to 
experience more development due to the “indirectness” of the British style of colonial 
administration. To others, former French colonies are expected to experience more 
development due to the “directness” of the French style of colonial administration. This 
paper examines various arguments in the literature regarding colonial style and 
compares them to the historical record.  Anecdotal evidence, alternative theoretical 
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arguments, and statistical evidence are all presented in an attempt to assess the validity 
of the differentiated colonial legacy hypothesis.  Additionally, this paper examines some 
of the common obstacles facing theorists who wish to utilize quantitative methods in 
order to study and explain African phenomena, and offers some suggestions for future 
quantitative research on Africa.  Specific attention should be paid to increasing the 
quality and quantity of African data and exploring new ways of conceptualizing variables 
such as political development, in order to increase their relevance to the African 
experience. 
 
Colonial and Post-Colonial Development 
From the mid 1800s until the mid 1900s, colonialism almost uniformly 
subjugated the African continent. Only Liberia and Ethiopia were spared direct colonial 
conquest.  Advances in medical science (specifically the discovery of quinine in the 
1850s as a cure for malaria) and weaponry (the machine gun was invented in the 1880s) 
facilitated European colonization of Africa in the 1880s.  By 1900, the European powers 
had partitioned most of Africa.  Although Italy, Germany, Belgium and Spain had 
colonies, Britain and France held the majority of African colonies: approximately 20 
each of what are now independent states.  
In the late 1950s, a wave of decolonization swept over most of the continent.  
Indigenous independence movements were gaining momentum and appealing to more 
and more native peoples.  Additionally, after World War II, Europe—which had with 
some exceptions ignored and in some cases suppressed prior pushes for independence—
struggled under the burden of financing both the cost of colonial administration and the 
cost of reconstruction after the war.  In 1958, France held referendums on independence 
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in its colonial countries. Each country was asked to choose between immediate 
independence and a gradual process of decolonization. Only Guinea chose immediate 
independence; the others gained independence beginning in 1960.  The process in 
former British colonies was less organized; each country individually negotiated its own 
independence from colonial rule.  By the early 1970s, only the Portuguese colonies and a 
handful of French colonies remained.  
There was an air of optimism about Africa’s post-colonial prospects1.  Many new 
countries were establishing themselves as democracies and opening their domestic 
markets to capitalist forces.  Economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s was significant in 
many African countries.  According to Collier and Gunning (1999), “[i]n the 1960s, 
Africa’s future looked bright” (3).  For the first half of the 20th century, and continuing 
through approximately 1963, economic growth in Africa had significantly outpaced 
economic growth in Asia (3).  Sierra Leone, a country that by all accounts has been an 
economic and political disaster for much of the last 40 year period, enjoyed 3.8 percent 
average growth during the 1960s (World Development Indicators 2001).  In the late 
1960s and early 1970s, however, researchers were forced to change their predictions and 
understandings of the nature of African development as the continent as a whole began 
to struggle with soaring inflation rates, excessive debt burdens, and negative economic 
growth rates.  Africa fared no better in the 1980s as economic stagnation persisted and 
economies entered severe recessions.  Regional growth for sub-Saharan Africa during 
                                                 
1 Surendra J. Patel, a member of the secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 
Addis Abba, was one such optimist. In 1964, he wrote “the distance that now separates agricultural 
scarcity in Africa from surplus in industrial countries is neither very large nor very difficult to cover.  The 
gap in the industrial field is very wide—output being 32 times as high in the industrial countries. This 
appears formidable, but could be overcome in only 40 or 50 years if industrial output per capita were 
raised annually at a rate of seven to nine percent (that is, a growth rate of about 9 to 11 per cent for total 
industrial output.) This is a high rate, but many countries have attained it in recent years” (337-338). 
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the 1980s was only 1.7 percent; the only region with lower annual growth was North 
Africa and the Middle East which experienced 0.4 percent growth during the same time 
period (van de Walle, 2001, 5)  Then, in the 1990s, following on the heels of the 
democratization of much of Africa, researchers again were forced to adjust their 
understandings of development in the African setting to account for the increased 
diversity of outcomes across the continent as some countries were experiencing 
significant economic growth and development while others continued to experience 
economic stagnation and civil and political strife.  
Africa’s experience with political development has closely paralleled its 
experience with economic development.  Although many African countries emerged as 
independent democracies, they quickly succumbed to party struggles, coups, civil wars, 
and turned to dictatorial or single-party forms of rule.  For the next two decades, 
autocracy was the norm. According to Sandbrook (2000 3), “[o]f the original forty-seven 
Sub-Saharan countries, only three—Mauritius, Botswana, and Gambia –retained 
multiparty democracy for twenty years or more.”  However, by the early 1990s, many 
countries began to experiment with multiparty elections.  In 1990, Benin, setting an 
example that many other countries would soon follow, held the first National 
Conference to revisit the constitution and allow for multiparty elections. Over the next 
few years, other countries followed suit, and by 1995, “29 countries had held a total of 54 
elections, with observers hailing more than half as ‘free’” (Gibson 2002 202).   
The above characterization of African economic and political development is 
purposefully broad and sweeping, illustrating the general temporal trends experienced 
across the continent.  While it is true that the African continent has, generally speaking, 
suffered from much economic underdevelopment and political development has been 
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underwhelming (at least through the 1980s), this is not to say that there has been no 
development, progress or growth.  There are bright spots such as Botswana which 
enjoyed remarkable economic growth throughout the post-colonial era.  From 
independency until 1999, Kenya and Tunisia both averaged approximately 5% annual 
GDP growth (World Development Indicators 2001).  Botswana and The Gambia enjoyed 
significant political development throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, both 
maintaining democratic polities and holding regular elections.   Thus, there is some 
variation in development.  We must look at the exact records of all African countries in 
order to get a better sense and more exact understanding of African development 
trajectories.  
Some researchers have explained these differences in economic and political 
outcomes as path dependent products of a colonial legacy; however, the exact nature 
and mechanisms identified vary widely. The long-lasting impacts of colonialism, and the 
nature and duration of this legacy has long been debated in the literature on African 
economic development.  As a subset of the colonial legacy debate, the differences 
between British and French colonial legacies have also been contested. Thus far, there is 
no consensus on this question of colonial power legacy.  
Has there been a marked difference in performance between former British and 
former French colonies? This paper examines economic and political development in 
post-colonial Africa, specifically, seeking to weigh in on the debate over differentiated 
colonial legacy. I argue that there is no substantive difference in development levels 
between former British and former French colonies. The stylistic differences in colonial 
styles have been exaggerated.  Moreover, the advent of Welfare colonialism in the post-
World War I era affected both British and French colonial policies.  Welfare colonialism 
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required direct control through spending and policy and both British and French 
colonial administrators pursued these types of policies.  
  The underlying mercantilist and extractive imperatives driving European 
colonization of Africa have had more serious negative consequences for development, 
which overrides any purported differences in rule style.  Colonialism has had a very 
negative, constraining effect on development in general.  However, neither French nor 
British colonies have enjoyed a marked advantage in development or growth.  This 
paper represents a first attempt by the author to explore colonial legacy.  The 
exploration of British versus French colonial rule is only meant to narrow the focus on 
colonial legacy and attempt to help suggest future research on colonial legacy. 
In order to explore post-colonial development in Africa, I begin by examining the 
general factors believed to influence economic and political development, and the 
relationship between the two.  This broad review of the theories of development is 
meant to both provide a foundation for understanding, specifically, how colonialism has 
affected development in Africa. Then I turn to general theories of colonialism in Africa, 
examining what some argue the effects of colonial domination have been.  I then focus 
on the specific arguments regarding British and French colonial administrative styles, 
demonstrating how there has been no consensus on the theory of differentiated colonial 
legacy and presenting some compelling theoretical arguments and some anecdotal 
evidence undermining the assertion of differentiated legacy.  The data analysis section 
examines the respective economic and political development of former British and 
former French colonies using difference of means tests and outlines how to test the 
theory of differentiated colonial legacy using regression analysis while presenting the 
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alternative hypotheses that must be evaluated alongside differentiated colonial legacy.  
The findings of the empirical research are then presented and discussed.   
 
Theories of Development 
This section on development discusses several different general arguments and 
theories regarding economic and political development and the obviously 
interdependent relationship between the two which also affects many of the variables 
discussed.  In order to highlight the relationship between colonialism and development, 
two specific schools of thought regarding development— dependency theory and statist 
theory2—are examined throughout this section.  Dependency theory, which emerged in 
the 1950s as an alternative to modernization theory, provides several possible 
mechanisms through which colonialism could affect long-term, post-colonial 
development.  Statist theories offer alternative understandings of how states may 
develop regardless of colonial legacy and lay the foundation for the control variables 
used in the data analysis section.   
Although there is much variation in what is termed dependency theory, there are 
a few running themes in the literature.  First, a country’s specific history matters and 
affects future prospects for development.  For many dependency theorists, the origins of 
underdevelopment can be traced back to each country’s colonial period where an 
uneven and unequal trade relationship was established (Gunder Frank 1969; Dos Santos 
1970).  Second, transnational factors have important implications for domestic 
development (Baran 1958; Prebisch 1959; Cardoso and Falleto 1979).  Specifically, the 
                                                 
2 While there are different variations in what can be termed statist theories, this paper specifically examines those 
that argue that the state should be analyzed as an actor.   
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structural relationship between what have been termed “center” or “core” countries and 
“periphery” countries positively affects development in the core and negatively affects 
development in the periphery (Galtung 1971; Wallerstein 1974b).3  This is due to several 
different reasons, including relationships established during imperial and colonial 
periods, which will be discussed further throughout this paper.  Third, development is 
not inevitable and does not occur in phases or stages (Baran 1958; Baran and 
Hobsbawm 1973 [1961]).  This argument is in direct opposition to Modernization 
theories, such as those put forth by Lerner (1961) and Lipset (1959), which generally 
contend that economic development occurs in evolutionary or progressive stages.   
Statist theories, simply put, emphasize the role of the state as an actor affecting 
development.  Authors such as Alice Amsden, Peter Evans, Stephan Haggard, David 
Laitin, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol—all contributors to the “Bringing the 
State Back In” movement—exemplify statist authors.  To them, previous understandings 
of the role of the state in development tended to either ignore or underplay the role of 
the state.  Skocpol (1985) specifically argues that as state has incorrectly been viewed as 
an instrument or arena rather than an actor.  She believes that the state as an actor   
should be given a “central place” in research (28).   
Although some statist theorists have drawn upon the dependency framework in 
their understandings of development (Laitin 1985), there is a definite tension between 
statist theories and dependency theories of development.  Dependency theorists tend to 
focus primarily on resource endowment, economic structure, international capital and 
                                                 
3 Core countries are generally considered to be the Western advanced industrialized countries (i.e., Western Europe, 
United States, Canada, etc.).  The periphery countries are generally considered to be the underdeveloped countries 
located in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.  Wallerstein (1974a) coined the term “semi-periphery” to refer to those 
countries that exist somewhere between the core and periphery, i.e., those that are declining core countries or 
improving periphery countries.  
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historical institutional arrangements in their theories of development and 
underdevelopment.  Some statists have criticized dependency theorists for neglecting to 
examine the role of domestic policies and institutions—which they perceive as integral 
factors in assessing causes of development and underdevelopment (Amsden 2003; 
Evans 1985; Haggard 1990).  This is not to say that statist theories ignore the role of 
resource endowment, economic structure, etc. in their analyses of development, but 
rather that they focus their respective analyses on how policies and institutions shape 
and mediate the effects of these factors.   
These four categories of factors—resource endowment, economic structure, 
international capital, and institutions and policies—will be examined below.  
Dependency theory and statist theory will be incorporated into the discussion on 
development where applicable.  
Development is a rather abstract concept.  Growth, progress, and expansion are 
all synonymous with development, but what exactly do they mean? While most would 
agree that they know development when they see it, pinning down an exact or precise 
definition proves very difficult.  What exactly are we referring to?  In this paper, 
development is used in a comparative sense to facilitate the examination of different 
levels of economic and political growth and progress among different regions and 
countries.  This section on development discusses the relevant arguments and theories 
regarding economic and political development and the obviously interdependent 
relationship between the two which affects many of the variables discussed. 
Economic Development  
Economic development often implies the expansion or enlargement of economic 
activity and production.  Gross domestic product and per-capita income are sometimes 
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used as proxy measures for economic development.  To compare economic 
development, Wiarda (2004) uses scales of per-capita income developed by the World 
Bank to differentiate levels of development.  Low income countries are classified as 
those with an average per-capita income of $755 or less; lower-middle-income countries 
as those with an average per-capita income of between $755 and $2,995; upper-middle-
income countries are those between $2,996 and $9,265; high-income countries are 
those with a per-capital income of $9,266 or higher (2).  As Wiarda points out, a high-
income country would look decidedly different from a low-income country in terms of 
size and scope of the economy, average income levels, and general infrastructure 
development.  
However, GDP growth and GDP per capita growth may be better indicators of 
economic development; specifically GDP per capita growth, which captures the growth 
of the economy, while simultaneously controlling for population growth.  North and 
Thomas (1973) convincingly argue that growth in GDP per capita is a more appropriate 
measure of economic growth than GDP growth as “[t]rue economic growth thus implies 
that the total income of society must increase more rapidly than population” (1).  
Additionally, treating economic growth as an interval measure allows for more specific 
and accurate econometric analysis.  
What are the salient factors which are believed to account for economic growth?  
Resource endowment, economic structure, international capital, and institutional 
structures are all often cited in the economic development literature as accounting for 
differences in economic development levels.  The arguments pertaining to the role of 
each factor are presented in the following sections.  As dependency theorists identify 
resource endowment, economic structure, international capital and institutional 
 11
arrangements as particularly important for understanding economic development, the 
specific arguments pertaining to each factor are also presented.  Both dependency and 
statist theories on institutions and policies are also examined and compared; 
dependency theory specifically as it addresses larger international and transnational 
institutional structures and statist theory as it examines domestic institutions and 
policies.  
Resource Endowment 
The prospects for development are widely expected to be influenced by such 
“natural” resources as population, urbanization, land quality, climate, and highly 
valuable natural resources.  Population growth is often considered an important variable 
when exploring economic development.  According to Malthus (1798), population 
growth, if left unchecked, will lead to poverty and famine.  He believed that as 
population growth increases geometrically, it will eventually outpace man’s ability to 
produce foodstuffs or sustenance, which increases arithmetically.  But according to 
Boserup (1965), and in direct tension with Malthus, population growth is the engine that 
leads to changes and advancements (i.e., technical improvements, increased efficiency) 
in agricultural production.  She argues, that based on this relationship, population 
growth encourages economic growth.  Although theories concerning population and 
development have been inconsistent over time, sometimes supporting the notion that 
population increases lead to economic decline and other times supporting the notion 
that population increases lead to economic growth, the empirical record indicates that 
economic growth and population growth have often coincided (McNicholl 2003).   
Urbanization, although sometimes taken as a proxy measure for 
industrialization, has other implications.  Increased numbers or percentages of urban 
 12
populations may be easier to educate as their dense location may make it easier to 
dispense government services such education (and health care) to larger numbers of 
people.  Larger markets may allow for the emergence of economies of scale and scope, 
which are believed to facilitate economic growth. Bradshaw (1987) finds tenuous 
support for the theory that increased urbanization is associated with economic growth; 
however, he finds that rapid urbanization undermines economic expansion and forces 
labor into service and informal sectors.  Additionally, some have argued that large-scale 
urbanization undermines economic development as governments are forced to divert 
resources to education, health care, poverty, crime and other general city services 
(Timberlake and Kentor 1983; Zuberi et al. 2003) 
Land quality is frequently mentioned when evaluating economic growth (Bloom 
and Sachs 1998; Gallup et al. 1999; Sachs 2001; Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997, 1999, 
2001).  Coquery-Vidrovitch (1969) argues that differences in climate and land quality 
are responsible for different levels of economic development in Africa, regardless of 
colonial power.  Examining all French colonial holding in Africa, she believes that 
French West Africa has an overall better climate for economic development and thus 
should grow faster than French Equatorial Africa.  Due to its large swathes of land which 
are difficult to control, French Equatorial Africa has experienced more frequent conflict 
and had more difficulties establishing government control, which she believes could 
pose serious problems for future development.  Sachs and Warner (1997) argue that 
tropical countries grow slower than non-tropical countries due to their dependence on 
the vagaries of the environment which make agricultural productivity difficult and 
unpredictable, and the higher incidence of tropical diseases such as malaria which result 
in higher morbidity rates.   
 13
Another issue of central concern to African countries is the presence of highly 
valuable natural resources.  While it might seem counter-intuitive at first, many 
researchers believe that the presence of diamonds, gold, oil and other highly valuable 
natural resources may create a significant impediment to meaningful or sustained 
economic development (Van Wijnbergen 1984; Gelb 1988; Deaton 1999).  According to 
Hill (1990), when an economy experiences a boom or windfall of revenue from one 
specific sector (oil, diamonds, etc.), “[t]he increased export revenues will tend to 
appreciate the real exchange rate, leading to a loss of competitiveness and hence a fall in 
output in other tradable goods sectors” (3).  Additionally, if the government treats this 
windfall as a permanent phenomenon when it is a temporary occurrence, this can lead 
to “excessive real exchange rate appreciation and increasing wages, then balance of 
payments crises, instability of income growth, reduced diversification, and wasted 
resources” (3).  The aforementioned economic effects are what are commonly referred to 
as the “Dutch Disease.”  
According to dependency theory, resource endowment is identified as one of the 
primary means (and motivation) of the exploitation of the periphery by the core.  
Resources in the periphery, including labor, agricultural products, minerals, and oil 
deposits, are used to enrich the core—at the expense of development in the periphery.   
In The Political Economy of Growth, Baran (1957) argues that developed countries 
exploit the underdeveloped countries for their primary goods and resources.  He claims 
that developed countries consciously want to exploit underdeveloped countries and 
actively prevented their economic development as that was contrary to the interests of 
the advanced world: “the ruling class in the United States (and elsewhere) is bitterly 
opposed to the industrialization of the so-called ‘source countries’ and the emergence of 
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integrated processing economies in the colonial and semi-colonial areas” (12).  Baran’s 
argument that this dependent relationship centered on resources discourages 
industrialization leads directly to the next factor believed to affect economic 
development: economic structure.  
Economic Structure 
For many different reasons, level of industrialization has long been cited as a 
main contributing factor to economic development (Smith 1776; Young 1928; Prebisch 
1959).  According to Engel’s law (1857), as incomes increase, demand for agricultural 
goods increases significantly less than does demand for manufactured goods.  Thus, 
economies based predominantly on agricultural products will grow more slowly than 
industrialized economies.  Dependence on agricultural products also ties countries to 
vagaries of the environment such as rainfall, soil conditions, etc. which makes growth 
unpredictable and unstable.  Additionally, it has been reported that, since the 1950s, 
prices for agricultural products have experienced a significant relative decline in price 
compared to prices for industrial goods (FAO 2004).  
As some dependency theorists argue (and from a world system perspective), a 
lack of indigenous technological development, which should propel industrialization, 
forces peripheral countries to remain dependent on the core countries’ technological 
imports and relegates them to a position of relative economic backwardness.  
Dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank (1969) and Paul Baran (1957) 
theorized that there could be no development in the underdeveloped countries based on 
this unequal relationship.  They believed that the structure of the international capitalist 
system required the exploitation of periphery countries by core countries and, due to 
this capitalist relationship, those countries that entered the system as underdeveloped 
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countries would remain underdeveloped countries. Other dependency theorists were 
more optimistic regarding the possibilities for development in the periphery.  Prebisch 
(1959), for example, offered specific policy prescriptions regarding trade which he 
believed would offset the debilitating effects of the unequal relationship between the 
core and periphery.  His suggestion, import substituting industrialization, is discussed 
further below. 
Trade is also frequently mentioned as one of the factors directly affecting 
economic growth. There have been some lively debates over the years regarding the 
impact of trade on development, and some especially interesting debates focusing 
exclusively on trade in underdeveloped countries.  During the 1960s and 1970s, some 
theorists, including Prebisch, touted ISI as the solution to underdevelopment in Latin 
America. It requires that countries heavily discourage international trade while 
encouraging domestic industrialization.  ISI, by increasing the goods produced and 
marketed from domestic sources, is hypothesized to correct for the effects of foreign 
trade elasticity and the unequal trade relationships between more developed countries 
and less developed countries.  The historical record, however, has revealed ISI to be 
largely and overwhelmingly a failure and many believe ISI has been effectively 
discredited (Krueger 1998). 4 
On the other hand, several theorists have argued that free and open trade 
promotes economic development for various theoretical reasons including economies of 
scale, comparative advantage, and dynamic gains, for example  (Smith 1776; Ricardo 
1817; Baldwin 1992).  Krueger (1998) has suggested that open-trade is necessary for 
economic growth in less developed countries.  According to her, trade allows smaller, 
                                                 
4 See Bruton (1999) or Waterbury (1999) for more on the reasons for the failure of ISI.  
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less developed markets to focus on whatever commodity they have a comparative 
advantage in and allows them to enjoy economies of scale in production by immediately 
expanding their market size.  Additionally, she believes that the failures of ISI indicate 
that open, more liberalized trade policies are the most appropriate trade policy.   
Collier and Gunning (1999) agree increased trade and openness to trade are 
important for economic growth and development in Africa, but they are less optimistic 
than theorists such as Krueger, who believe that trade is the primary engine for 
economic growth.  They believe that other factors such as geography, poor domestic 
policies, and poor delivery of public goods are equally culpable. Additionally, based on 
the successes of the East Asian Tigers (Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and Hong 
Kong), who each pursued a protectionist, export-oriented growth strategy, it is difficult 
to conclusively argue that free and open trade is the only route to economic growth and 
development.  They types of policies pursued by the East Asian Tigers will be discussed 
further in the section below on Institutions and Policies.  
International Capital 
Foreign aid and investment comprise another category of variables which is often 
believed to affect economic development.  The arguments regarding aid and investment 
are similar, as they both represent foreign capital, but the mechanisms which drive them 
are slightly different.  This is due to the fact that aid is essentially unearned rent and, as 
such, goes directly to the state, circumventing market mechanisms, whereas investment 
is directed through the market to productive activities.   
There is a debate in the literature over whether foreign aid, by providing 
additional funding for infrastructure improvements and capital to stimulate industrial 
growth, positively affects growth rates, or rather by reducing government reliance on 
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civil society and retarding indigenous capitalist growth, does more harm than good.  
Researchers such as Boone (1996) and Van de Walle (2000) are of the latter school.  
According to Boone, who analyzed data from almost 100 developing countries from 1971 
to 1990, a significant portion of foreign aid has been used directly for government or 
bureaucratic expenses to enlarge the government and thus reduces the effectiveness of 
aid to promote economic development.  In fact, he finds no significant relationship 
between aid and growth in his research.  Van de Walle argues that foreign aid often 
allows weak governments to remain in power, unscrupulous governments to pilfer aid 
funds for their own purposes (political and other), and undermines state reliance on 
domestic taxes.   
However, there are many researchers who argue that international aid can have 
positive effects (Levy 1988; Hadjimichael et al. 1995; Burnside and Dollar 2000).  
Certainly this belief is the basis for the continued mandate of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (or World Bank).  Spearheaded by prominent 
economist John Maynard Keynes and US Treasury official Harry Dexter White in the 
1940s, the World Bank was originally established in order to help finance European 
Reconstruction.  Once the Marshall Plan was developed and implemented in the 1950s, 
however, the purpose of the bank changed.  Beginning in the late 1950s, the World Bank 
began promoting development across the globe through the granting of low-interest 
loans and development assistance to poorer countries (Caufield 1996) 
During the early postcolonial period of heightened optimism (the 1950s and 
1960s), many theorists believed that the influx of foreign capital and technology, 
through foreign direct investment, would cause underdeveloped countries to rapidly 
grow, much the same as foreign aid.  Rostow (1960), for example, predicted a positive 
 18
relationship between foreign investment and economic growth.  More recent theorists 
such as Roemer (1993) have echoed this sentiment.  Kentor (1999), however, has argued 
that there exists a difference between short term and long term effects of FDI, whereas 
short term effects appear to be positive, but in the long-run (20 years plus), FDI has a 
negative effect on growth.  He argues that this is due to the fact that a small, elite 
number of businessmen and politicians primarily benefit from FDI and, more broadly, 
over time a market dependence on foreign capital is created and perpetuated by FDI.  
To some researchers, foreign direct investment and aid are indicative of the 
continuing dependent relationship between the core and the periphery. FDI and aid 
represent the linkages by which core countries exploit and take advantage of the 
periphery (Alschuler 1976; Tyler and Wogart 1973).  According to Dos Santos (1970), 
there have historically been three different forms of dependence: colonial dependence, 
financial-industrial dependence, and technological-industrial dependence.  On this third 
form of dependence, technological-industrial dependence, Dos Santos writes: “In the 
postwar period a new type of dependence has been consolidated, based on multinational 
corporations which began to invest in industries geared to the internal market of 
underdeveloped countries” (232).  It would be safe to assume that Dos Santos would 
believe that underdeveloped countries are currently experiencing technological-
industrial dependence.   
 Studies by Bornschier et al. (1978) and Dolan and Tomlin (1980), while explicitly 
stating that they are not attempting, for various reasons, to empirically test dependency 
theory, conclude that the empirical record does not refute dependency theories’ claims 
that foreign aid and foreign investment adversely affect economic growth.  Both studies 
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find that foreign aid and investment have long-term negative effects on economic 
growth and are related to increases in income inequality.  
Institutions and Policies 
Institutions, as North (1990) so succinctly puts it are “the rules of the game of a 
society” (23).  Prominent theorists such as Douglass North, Mancur Olson, and 
Hernando de Soto argue that domestic institutions are responsible for economic 
underdevelopment.  North (1990) believes that institutions, by structuring incentives, 
have the ability to reduce or increase transaction costs, which in turn, affect economic 
development.  Olson (2000) believes economic development is fundamentally rooted in 
the incentive structures generated by different forms of government.   
Policies, generally speaking, are a product of institutions, thus it is convenient to 
analyze institutions and policies together as a single subfield of theoretical research.  
Researchers have focused on both macro and micro level policies when analyzing 
growth and development.  Macro level policies generally refer to larger national and 
transnational economic policies pursued by the state.  Some theorists, especially those 
who promote neo-classical economic policies (Anne O. Krueger and Jagdish N. 
Bhagwati, for example) believe that state interventions in the market place retard 
economic growth minimal government interventions and reliance on free trade 
promotes growth.  Others, such as Amsden (1985; 1989) and Rueschemeyer and Evans 
(1985), believe that well-informed state interventions and guidance in markets produce 
positive economic effects.  Micro level policies refer to those policies pursued by the 
state which directly affect individuals.  According to both de Soto and Olson, property 
rights are instrumental for understanding aggregate economic development and 
underdevelopment.   
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North (1990) believes that economic development is broadly based on 
institutional arrangements and the impact of these institutions on transaction costs.  
Different institutional arrangements, he argues, create different incentives and affect 
transaction costs in different ways.  Democratic, or more specifically representative 
institutions, create efficient property rights, which in turn, prevent monopolistic 
organizations, and encourages and facilitates trade.  Efficient property rights, as North 
and Thomas (1973) pointed out in an earlier work decrease transaction costs by 
matching the cost/benefit payoff for individual good with the cost/benefit payoff for the 
social good. Thus democratic institutions are more conducive to economic development 
than are non-democratic or non-representative forms of government.  The argument 
that democratic institutions are more likely to promote economic development than 
autocratic institutions has been made by many researchers including Olson (1991) and 
Sklar (1987) and is echoed by Olson (2000).  
North also makes an argument regarding the persistence of inefficient 
institutions. He argues, and many dependency theorists would agree, that we can only 
understand current institutional arrangements by analyzing the history of institutions 
and how they have incrementally evolved over time.  The relationship he identifies is 
path dependent, which implies a “stickiness” of development, and requires critical 
junctures (or large, significant breaks with the past) to change institutions.  Path 
dependency, as many dependency theorists note, is one of the primary explanations for 
how colonial institutions have persisted over long periods of time.  This argument 
underpins colonial legacy arguments, and while dependency theorists would agree with 
North that path dependency has allowed inefficient institutions to persist, they would 
disagree with his solution of capitalist, free-market mechanisms to generate growth.  
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The essence of Olson’s (2000) argument is related to the basic interest of the 
government in the welfare of society—whether the government has a narrow interest or 
an encompassing interest.  Olson then takes this argument regarding narrow versus 
encompassing interests and uses it to compare autocratic and democratic systems. 
Democratic systems inherently represent a larger segment of the population and thus 
have more encompassing interests in social welfare.  They will be more inclined than 
autocratic governments to encourage economic development and growth through 
institutional incentives, i.e. property rights.  Autocratic governments, while having more 
encompassing interests than anarchic systems, for example, still have less of an interest 
in the welfare of society than democratic governments.   
The theories of North and Olson, which ultimately promote capitalist and 
democratic institutions, are in direct tension with the theories of dependency. Whereas 
authors such as North and Olson argue that capitalism, by promoting individual rights, 
will stimulate economic growth and productivity, many dependency theorists would 
disagree with the promotion of economic development through capitalist or free market 
systems.  In fact, many of them believe the capitalist system is largely to blame for the 
underdevelopment, and that only through a severing of ties to the core will development 
be possible.  For example, Baran (1958) suggests that socialist institutions would be 
more appropriate to remedy the situation of dependence and Prebish (1959) promotes a 
closed-market system through ISI as a means to development. ISI  creates a very large 
role for the state.  
For various reasons, many authors argue against just such a role for the state in 
development (Krueger 1998; Wolf 1979).  Bates (1981) believes that typical government 
interventions in agricultural markets—and markets more generally—result in economic 
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inefficiency.  Specifically looking at Africa’s struggles with development, Bates argues 
that poor domestic policy choices are responsible for economic underdevelopment.  In 
an effort to promote industrialization (at the expense of agriculture), African 
policymakers made schizophrenic, contradictory policy choices, which proved ultimately 
detrimental to economic development.   
In addition to bad and inefficient policy, theories regarding rent seeking 
represent another possible hazard of government intervention in markets.  Rents are 
income earned from non-productive activities, both legal (i.e., quotas) and illegal (i.e., 
bribes).  While not always detrimental to economies, competition for rents can induce 
individuals and firms, alike, to operate outside of the market and divert income from 
more productive sectors.   According to Krueger (1974), state-induced distortions in 
market mechanisms, through policies such as quotas, import licensing, and price 
ceilings and floors can create rents. Kruger, who popularized the phase “rent seeking,” 
believes that competition for rents can lead to economic inefficiency and can undermine 
economic growth. Looking specifically at Senegal, but applicable to other African 
countries as well, Boone (1990) suggests that development in Africa has been stalled, in 
part, by what she refers to as the “rentier class” which has no incentive to invest to 
accumulate capital or invest in productive activities.  According to her, the state in 
Senegal has actively pursued clientlistic or patronage based politics which encourages 
and, in some cases, relies on rents to maintain political support.    
Many statists, however, have argued that the state, and more specifically state 
intervention and guidance, can stimulate economic development.  According to 
Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985), state policies may play a rather pivotal and positive 
role in economic development.  To them, “effective state intervention” is crucial for 
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economic development (44).  However, the state must have a capable bureaucracy and 
autonomy from social interests in order to adopt economic policies that will promote 
growth and development.  
The specific experiences, and successes, of East Asian industrialization have often 
been cited as examples of positive and effective state intervention.   Wade (1990) argues 
that, contrary to neoclassical arguments that Taiwan’s significant growth from the 1960s 
to 1980s was due to free market mechanisms and restrained government action, 
significant state guidance did occur and was instrumental in Taiwan’s economic 
successes.  Amsden (1985) argues that Taiwan’s impressive development and growth 
can be attributed to effective state intervention which promoted export-led growth. In 
her 1989 book Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, Amsden 
makes similar claims regarding positive state intervention and guidance and the 
successful development of South Korea.  
In his book The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and 
Fails Everywhere Else, De Soto (2000) indirectly addresses some of the tensions 
between the theories of authors such as North and Olson, and dependency theories.  He 
acknowledges that capitalism has largely been a failure in the periphery, however, he 
believes that “[c]apitalism stands alone as the only feasible way to rationally organize a 
modern economy” (1).  He blames the lack of clearly defined property rights, which 
prevents the easy transference of possessions into capital, for economic 
underdevelopment.  Only when effective property rights are legitimized and enforced, 
will capitalism be able to positively affect growth in periphery countries.  He 
understands why, for underdeveloped countries, capitalism seems inimical to 
development.  According to him, policymakers have been too preoccupied with macro 
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level policy prescriptions (stabilization and adjustment) and have, consequently, 
ignored the necessary micro level policies (property rights) that would stimulate 
economic growth.  
This review of the factors affecting economic development is not exhaustive. The 
effects of institutions and policies suggest that political development also impacts 
economic development. The following section addresses theories of political 
development and the factors believed to impact political development/democratization.  
Political Development 
The literature on political development is extensive. It is a concept that theorists 
have been defining and redefining for the better part of the history of the discipline.  
Some theorists use regime type synonymously with political development. Prominent 
researchers such as Samuel Huntington and those commonly referred to as 
Modernization theorists (Lipset, Lerner, Almond, etc.) in fact equate democracy with 
the concept of political development.5   In the 1960s, Huntington (1965) argued that the 
concept had been defined in “many and multiple” ways over the years, but that 
generally, theorists agree that political development involved the “rationalization, 
integration, and democratization” of a political system (387-388).  In a parsed down 
“Weberian” definition, political development can refer to the ability of the government 
to effectively and legitimately penetrate and control its territory.  However, the manner 
of control is also considered a fundamental part of the definition of political 
development.  Political freedom, civil liberties, and equality are valued by many as being 
integral to the definition of political development.  To this end, political development is 
often times equated with democracy. Polity and Vanhanen, two measures of political 
                                                 
5 See Huntington (1965), Lipset (1959), and Lerner (1958).  
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development, use a spectrum of development with autocracy being the lowest form of 
political development and democracy being the highest measure of political 
development.  
Democracy, defined very broadly, incorporates the concepts of freedom, liberty, 
equality, and representation into a system of government.  Democratic systems 
generally hold competitive elections, experience stable electoral alternations, and 
through elections, provide political representation to the citizenry.  Generally, 
autocracies are viewed as the absence of these qualities. They do not hold competitive 
elections, restrict political freedom and civil liberties, and offer little in the way of 
representation. Democracy, by typically embodying these aforementioned valued 
characteristics, is looked upon as a higher, or more developed regime type.   
Other researchers have focused on state-building as an indication of political 
development.  Concepts associated with state-building include institutionalization of the 
political system and, closely related to institutionalization, legitimate acceptance of 
political system as the only system of government.  State autonomy—the state’s ability to 
formulate and pursue its own goals independently of society—and state capacity—the 
state’s ability to penetrate the periphery and provide such things as security or other 
public goods—have also been used as a measure of political development.   
Skocpol (1985), in her influential article “Bringing the State Back In,” uses the 
concepts of autonomy and capacity as measures of state development.  Autonomy refers 
to a government’s ability to impose its own policy prerogatives upon the will of society.  
Capacity refers to bureaucratic abilities to deliver goods and services. Migdal (1989), 
examining state-society relations in less developed countries, uses the concept of state 
strength as a measure of political development.  However, factors such as 
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institutionalization, legitimacy, autonomy, capacity, and state strength are generally 
very difficult to empirically measure, which may help explain why few, if any, empirical 
studies on political development include these concepts and why virtually no datasets 
include these variables.  On the other hand, several reliable indicators of democracy 
have been constructed, making democracy a much more attractive indicator of political 
development for many researchers.  
What are the factors that influence political development?  A country’s 
indigenous resources are believed to shape that country’s prospects for political 
development, in light of broader international forces and trends.6  Of these resources, 
social demographic composition, social capital, and natural resource endowment are 
three factors believed to affect a country’s chances of democratization and have specific 
importance in the African context.  After examining the impact of social factors and 
resource endowments on political development in the following sections, the 
interdependent relationship between political development and economic development 
is taken up.  
Social Factors 
The ethnic, religious, and linguistic composition of society is believed to affect 
political development.  More heterogeneous societies, or those with more frequent and 
salient cleavages, may prove difficult to consolidate under one unified democratic 
system.  In Polyarchy, Dahl (1971) argued that severe ethnic and religious 
fragmentation could be dangerous for democracy as these divisions pit groups against 
each other for state resources and power.  Ake (1993) believes that in Africa, ethnic and 
                                                 
6 International factors such as diffusion effects (i.e. Samuel Huntington’s Third Wave of Democracy) and 
opportunity structure (i.e. the Cold War) certainly have an impact on political development; however, 
international effects tend to induce broader cross-national trends.  This paper focuses on the country-
specific factors that affect political development. 
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national identities capture the primary loyalties of individuals, to the detriment of the 
development of the state.  “They [ethnic and national identities] have largely displaced 
the state, which is often seen as contested terrain on which contending primary groups 
fight for the appropriation of what is supposed to be the common wealth” (244).  
Additionally, multiple ethnic and religious groups may have difficulty communicating 
with or identifying with each other, and ultimately difficulty trusting each other, which 
could prove problematic for democracy.   
Human capital refers to capabilities and abilities of a country’s peoples. Of all the 
issues one could discuss with regards to social capital, education might be the most 
important. Education is commonly believed by many theorists to affect political 
development.  Modernization theorists such as Lipset (1959) and Lerner (1958) believed 
it was the link between economic development and political development.  Specifically, 
they believed that as countries grew economically and were able to provide more and 
better educational opportunities to their peoples, more educated and literate 
populations would agitate for democratic change in non-democratic states.  Although 
modernization theory has been called into question by many theorists (Huntington, 
Baran, etc.), many still believe there is some link between education and democracy.  
Barro (1999), Przeworski et al. (2000), and Glaeser et al. (2004) have all recently 
offered quantitative evidence of a strong correlation between increasing levels of 
educational attainment and democracy.  
 Resource Endowment 
Some natural resources, specifically oil and minerals, are believed to undermine a 
country’s prospects for democracy.  Ross (2001) analyzes development data from 113 
countries from 1971 to 1997 and finds that oil and mineral wealth are negatively 
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correlated to democratization.  He argues that rents earned from natural resources such 
as oil, diamonds, etc. allow governments to pursue patrimonial politics, or effectively 
purchase political support through low tax rates and high domestic spending in order to 
“dampen pressures for democracy” (356).   Additionally, income earned from these 
natural resources allows governments to increase military spending which can be used 
to repress social pressure for democracy.   Reno (1999), citing the cases of Sierra Leone 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, finds that the presence of alluvial diamonds 
(which are difficult to centralize control over) has contributed to political instability, 
conflict, and ultimately, warlord politics, in both countries.  He argues that this is due to 
the ease of access to these highly valuable resources by non-governmental parties who 
then use these economic resources to control the state or, effectively destroy the state 
apparatus.   
Interdependent relationship 
As evidenced by the preceding sections which examined economic and political 
development independent of each other, the relationship between economic and 
political development is very difficult to disentangle.  Economic factors affect political 
development and political factors affect economic development. It is impossible to study 
either phenomenon in isolation.  As such, it is widely believed that there is some sort of 
relationship between the two; however, the exact nature of this relationship and the 
specific causal mechanisms and direction are a serious point of contention in the 
literature.  Modernization theorists such as Lipset (1959) and Lerner (1958) argued that 
economic development led to social development which, in turn, led to political 
development.  Furthermore, they believed development to be a unidirectional, 
progressive phenomenon. Several empirical studies since conducted, have offered 
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evidence to refute this understanding of development.  Przeworski et al. (2000) 
represents one such undertaking. Analyzing data from all countries from 1960 to 1999, 
they find that economic development does not bring about or cause democracy, but 
rather democracies survive in environments with relatively high levels of economic 
development.   
Theories on development—including dependency theory, modernization theory, 
and statist theory—suggest political variables such as regime type, conflict and adverse 
regime change all contribute to levels of economic development.  Beginning with the 
least controversial of these concepts, conflict and regime change both are believed to 
have adverse effects on economic development as it is difficult for economies to grow 
and prosper under conditions of ethnic conflict, civil war, and intra-state war.  Barro 
(1991), examining data from 1960 to 1985, found a negative correlation between 
political instability (measured as revolutions, coups, and political assassinations) and 
rates of economic growth.  Regime type is often believed to affect development. For 
many years, it was a commonly held belief that democracies were more conducive to 
economic growth than dictatorships.  Olson (1991) has argued that autocrats are less 
likely to promote economic development due to the fact that they can not “credibly 
commit” to the continuity of economic policy and that autocratic regimes are less secure 
than democratic regimes.  This belief, however, is called into question by the findings of 
Przeworski et al. (2000) who, based on extensive cross-national data analysis, find that 
democracies and dictatorships alike enjoy similar rates of economic growth in already 
poor, less developed countries.   
These theories on development all lead directly to the crux of this paper: colonial 
legacy.  Colonialism was a political, economic, and social institution that affected all 
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aspects of African development. Colonialism imposed foreign rule on often disparate 
groupings of people, extracted resources for development of the colonial power (often at 
the expense of the colonial state), and affected social groupings and social organizations.   
Many researchers believe that the institutions and imperatives of colonialism 
have had a deep and profound impact on development in Africa, effectively stymieing 
Africa’s chance for post-colonial development.  These factors we have discussed above 
are generally and universally believed to affect development.  However, some believe 
that colonialism has either overridden the effects we would expect of the development 
factors mentioned above and/or adversely affected these factors.  The following section 
examines common theories of colonial legacy and its effects on post-colonial 
development.  
 
Some Theories of Colonial Legacy 
For more than 80 years, the African continent was ruled by European powers 
pursuing European prerogatives. Colonialism laid the basis for the modern African 
state.  Prior to Europe’s colonial conquest of Africa, there were no modern states, but 
rather loosely organized kingdoms and city-states (Englebert 2001).   It is hard to 
believe that these years of colonial domination and foreign rule did not have a profound 
effect on Africa’s post-colonial performance and development.  However, the exact 
nature of these effects and the causal mechanisms which link Africa’s colonial past to its 
post-colonial development are still debated in the literature.   
Earlier theorists such as Peter Duignan and Lewis Gann (1967; 1975) believed 
that colonialism had an ultimately positive impact on development, helping to 
modernize and develop Africa.  However, at the time of their writings in the 1960s, 
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Africa had not experienced the political instability and economic failures of the 1970s 
and 1980s.  Other more recent theorists such as Pierre Englebert and Crawford Young, 
who wrote after decades of civil war, revolution and a burgeoning debt crisis, have 
argued that colonial domination has had a negative effect on postcolonial development.   
Africa’s colonialism, as it differs markedly from other regions’ experiences with 
colonialism, has been largely studied in isolation.  Young (1994) believes that the 
specific characteristics of African colonialism differ significantly from colonialism in 
other periods and regions based on, among other things, the dynamic partition/rapid 
conquest of colonial scramble in 1870s 1880s; the fact that survival depended on 
extraction, forced labor for revenue and accumulation; and the practice of “welfare 
colonialism” followed by decolonization created a large expected role for state.  These 
characteristics have created a unique African colonial legacy.  
There have been several approaches researchers have taken in examining the 
lasting effects of colonialism in Africa.  Most explore the effects colonialism has had on 
political development, economic development, and/or cultural development. Often 
times researchers examine the interdependent effects of colonialism on some 
combination of the aforementioned aspects of development. 
Some early theorists argued in favor of colonialism, defending its imperatives and 
suggesting that its positive effects would far outweigh its negative effects.  It was argued 
that colonialism introduced democracy, capitalism, and Christianity to the African 
continent.  Gann and Duignan (1967) argued that the “imperial system stands out as one 
of the most powerful engines for cultural diffusion in the history of Africa; its credit 
balance far outweighs its debit account” (382).  However, in the light of the difficulties 
of the African continent during the second-half of the 20th century (war, conflict, 
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recession, staggering debt, etc.), the positive effects of the colonial machine have been 
discredited.  Instead, this section highlights some of the more general negative effects 
associated with colonialism in Africa.  
One approach to colonial legacy has explored the impact that colonial rule had on 
economic and political institutions.  Jarret (1996), analyzing economic institutions, 
argued that colonialism destroyed the traditional economic system characterized by 
“mutual aid” or community-level development and established capitalist economies 
based on individual exchanges and market relationships.  According to Jarrett, 
colonialism forced nascent African capitalist economies to become overdependent on 
primary products, generally one or two specific products which benefited colonial 
powers’ home economies.  Primary products refer to agricultural products and other raw 
materials used in the production of other goods.  Agriculturally-based economies, it 
should be remembered, are tied to the vagaries of the environment, which make 
economic growth unpredictable and unstable.  
In Ghana, that primary product was cocoa; in Senegal and The Gambia, 
groundnuts; in Cote d’Ivoire, cocoa and coffee (29-30).  “[M]onoculture, the 
specialization in cash crops beneficial to the Colonial masters became the norm for 
farmers and the agricultural industries of Africa” (29).  Jarret cites the fact that prior to 
colonization there were many rice farmers in The Gambia, but the colonial priority 
placed on the production of groundnuts forced rice farms to be cleared; after 1899 rice 
had to be imported (30).  Colonial imperatives, then, changed the production patterns of 
colonies to suit their own needs.  His specific example of The Gambia, however, could be 
attributed to the country discovering that it has a comparative advantage in producing 
groundnuts which made them more profitable than rice.  Nonetheless these findings are 
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consistent with what many dependency theorists argue: that the economies of 
underdeveloped have remained underdeveloped as a function of the developed 
countries’ economic needs.  This relationship is considered to be path dependent and 
thus difficult to change, regardless of how long this economic arrangement has lasted.  
Englebert (2000) asserts that Africa’s underdevelopment is due to poor economic 
policy, which is rooted in a lack of state legitimacy.  This lack of legitimacy was inherited 
upon independence from Africa’s colonial rulers. According to Englebert, Africa’s 
experience differs dramatically from other regions experiences with colonialism and 
postcolonial state-making.  Unlike former colonies in the Middle East which were 
sovereign states prior to colonization Africa does not have a history of statehood, at least 
based upon the modern nation-state model, prior to colonization by European powers.  
Additionally, he argues that Africa’s postcolonial independence differs from postcolonial 
independence in the Americas, where “preexisting indigenous institutions and societies 
usually played no part in the new state system” (1823).   
These African states, he argues, lack legitimacy and social control.  Furthermore, 
the inherited states are only one of many competing claims for state power/control 
causing incredible instability and sustained rebellions against the state.  Based on the 
unruly and chaotic nature of the postcolonial African state, policymakers have a limited 
number of options available to them.  In order to maintain support (and office), many 
African governments have resorted to the purchasing of or coercion of support through 
patronage, clientelism and the like.7  These types of state predation rely on market 
distortions that create rents.  Engelbert’s research indicates that African governments 
                                                 
7 See Bratton and van de Walle (1997; 1994), Joseph (1987), Medard (1982), and Wantchekon (2003) for more on 
patronage and clientelism. 
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that lack legitimacy are less likely to invest in education and infrastructure, more likely 
to erect trade barriers to control markets and create distortions through rents. Rent-
seeking is related to economic underdevelopment and a lack of economic growth, as 
Krueger (1974) and Boone (1990) both point out.  
Another approach examines the cultural effects of colonialism on economic 
development. Ekeh (1975) presented a society-based argument, tying colonialism to the 
emergence of bi-cephalic societies in Africa which encouraged corruption and 
patrimonial politics.  Specifically, he believed that colonial rule created two distinct 
publics in Africa: the primordial public realm based on primordial groupings which have 
moral ties to the private realm through kinship and community, and the civic public 
realm which is based on civil structures imposed by colonialism such as the military and 
the police, and has no moral ties to the private realm. This relationship, alleges Ekeh, 
contributes to Africa’s development problems. “Our problems may be partially 
understood and hopefully solved by the realization that the civic public and the 
primordial public are rivals, that in fact the civic public is starved of badly needed 
morality” (111). Ekeh claims that these two distinct publics, one moral and one amoral, 
exist side by side in post-colonial Africa, perpetually in conflict. This conflict and 
specifically the existence of an amoral civic public are responsible for tribalism and 
corruption, which have plagued African states since independence. According to Ekeh’s 
theory, development in Africa can be understood in terms of a cultural colonial legacy.  
Young (1994) identifies patrimonial autocracy and the integral state as 
characteristics of the colonial legacy in Africa. “The colonial state in Africa lasted in 
most instances less than a century—a mere moment in historical time. Yet it totally 
reordered political space, societal hierarchies and cleavages, and modes of economic 
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production” (9).  In a later article, Young (2004) refines his original understandings of 
the colonial impact on Africa. Young argues that institutions, specifically the state, 
working in concert with culture, are responsible for Africa’s development thus far.  
According to Young, the post-colonial independent state inherited a command role for 
the state due to the strong and interventionist nature of the colonial state (as evidenced 
both the doctrine of effective occupation of the late 19th century and the expansion of the 
colonial state in the 1920s to address infrastructure needs) and racially-charged 
ideologies used by colonial rulers to legitimize foreign rule.  This command role 
generally led to autocratic political institutions as opposed to democratic political 
institutions.  Autocratic institutions, as both North (1990) and Olson (2000) caution, 
often times undermines incentives for economic growth.   
Young (1994) also points out that African independence coincided with the rise in 
prominence of socialist theories. “If the parastatal enterprise was not legitimated by 
socialist orientation, it found justification in the argument that, in the absence of 
indigenous capitalists, the state had to serve as surrogate collective capitalists” (31).  
Capitalist economic institutions, it has been argued, are more conducive to economic 
development than socialist institutions (North 1990; Olson 2000).  
 However, Young (2004) also argues that the independent African state no longer 
resembles the post-colonial African state and thus colonial legacy arguments are no 
longer relevant in describing Africa’s current development conditions. “[I]n many 
countries little remains of the hegemonic apparatus which African rulers inherited and 
initially sought to reinforce and expand as an instrument of rapid development” (24).  
For him, the colonial legacy argument lost its relevance around approximately 1990 
after the numerous regime changes and military dissolutions of the 1970s and 1980s, 
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demands for democratization and the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the 
increasing influence of globalization which “taken together they did erase the earlier 
post-colonial state’s claim to unencumbered hegemony” (43).  One of the only theorists 
to do so, Young argues for a temporally bounded colonial legacy.   
As the literature on colonialism has illustrated, colonialism significantly affected 
economic structures (by orienting colonial economies to the needs of the colonizing 
country and causing colonial economies to be overdependent on primary products), 
political institutions (by undermining state legitimacy and bequeathing a large and 
powerful state apparatus to the independent states), and social groupings (both in 
relation to the state and to others ethnic and social groups). Most contemporary 
scholars attribute Africa’s poor economic performance and political development, at 
least in part, to the legacy of colonialism. This explanation accounts perhaps for the 
differences in development and performance between Africa and other regions, but not 
for variations across Africa.   
Differences between Britain and France? 
Wieschhoff (1944), who offers a detailed analysis of colonial policies in British 
and French colonies, perceived significant differences in the general administrative 
policies, specifically the British “indirect” form of rule and the French “direct” form of 
rule.  The British, he argued, ruled their colonies “indirectly” through native institutions 
and native administrators (i.e., tribal chiefs), whereas the French ruled their colonies 
“directly” preferring to work through their own administrators (i.e., French colonial 
governors) and imposing their own governing institutions.  Gann and Duignan (1967), 
in their extensive work on colonialism in Africa, also make the claim that British 
colonies were ruled indirectly and French colonies were ruled directly. The direct-
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indirect/French-British typology is very common in the literature, especially looking at 
earlier works written in the 1930s and 1940s (Cunliffe-Lister 1932; Lord Lugard 1936; 
Korsah 1944; Lord Hailey 1948).   
This distinction is partially rooted in the differing political philosophies of Britain 
and France.  It has been argued that because British officials had long believed there to 
be eventual independence for their colonies, they practiced a more decentralized and 
indirect form of administration in order to prepare their colonies for self-rule.  Lord 
Hailey, writing in the 1940s, acknowledged just this: “[s]uccessive Secretaries of State, 
representing in turn each of the political parties in Great Britain, have made formal 
announcements that self-government is the goal of colonial policy” (1944 43).  On the 
other hand, French leadership, it has been argued, intended for its colonies to remain 
part of the French empire, and thus controlled them directly as an annexed territory of 
France. The French pursued policies of “association” and offered “no indications which 
point definitely to the establishment of colonial self-government” (Lord Hailey 42-43).  
Cooper (1996) makes this claim as well, that the British saw an eventual devolution of 
power as the long term goal of colonialism, whereas to the French, their colonies were to 
remain indefinitely part of the larger French empire (110).    
Some researchers believe that British “indirect” rule and French “direct” rule has 
had long-lasting consequences for development and have identified colonial 
administrative styles as an explanation for the variation in development across the 
African continent.  Asiwaju (1976) expects former French colonies to experience more 
conflict and instability than former British colonies.  He believes this to be due to several 
factors, including the differing administrative styles of Britain and France.  According to 
Asiwaju, the British tended to utilize traditional leaders (indirect rule), whereas the 
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French preferred to centralize control and work through their own administrators, thus, 
after independence, former British colonies had more of a state structure in place than 
did French colonies, as they could turn to the traditional leaders for governance while 
the French could not.  Additionally, he believes the French were responsible for 
establishing more arbitrary colonial boundaries which antagonized ethnic groups more 
than in British colonies (61).  These arbitrary boundaries and indigenous perceptions of 
illegitimacy, which are persistent, should result in more incidences of conflict in former 
French colonies than in former British colonies.   
In opposition to this finding, Blanton et al. (2001) argue that differences in 
British and French rule have led to more frequent and more intense ethnic conflict in 
former British colonies. Specifically, indirect rule allowed for too much competition and 
a lack of ethnic stratification which in turn, has “a profound [negative] effect on the 
willingness and ability of groups to mobilize for collective action” (475). This is an 
interesting finding. Unfortunately, these findings are undermined by serious 
methodological concerns—questionable temporal disconnect from their research 
question (to measure colonial legacy, they chose to analyze data from 1980 to 1995) and 
failing to control in their regression for effective number of ethnic groups.   
Arguments against Differentiated Colonial Legacy 
There is much to suggest that the indirect/direct or British/French typology 
oversimplifies or misunderstands the nature of European colonial rule in Africa, and 
that the purported stylistic differences between British and French colonial 
administration have been exaggerated.  Several different arguments questioning the 
existence and persistence of the indirect/direct distinction throughout the duration of 
colonialism are presented below.  Furthermore, it should be noted that this colonial 
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typology is based on the European perspective and the European impact on Africa, and 
ignores completely native African conditions or conditions “on the ground”.  
First, regardless of colonial power, all African chiefs who remained in power had 
to be approved by the colonial power (Kiwanuka 1970 301).  Comaroff (1998) believes 
that the colonial style distinction is merely cosmetic as the true power of the colonial 
state remained in the hands of the European colonizers, regardless of purported indirect 
or direct rule distinctions.   “[S]o-called ‘indirect rule’, which ostensibly retained local 
government in the hands of traditional authorities…in fact, made most chiefs and kings 
into menial civil servants of the empire” (20).  Mamdani (1996) asserts that both the 
British and French were forced to deal through Africans for administration and that, 
due to financial constraints, and only small numbers of colonial administrators were 
present in both British and French colonies.  Sindima (1995) also argues along these 
lines:  
In all the colonies the style of government was the same: rule without checks and 
balances. The attitude of the colonial power toward its colony, be it direct control 
(as did the French, Belgians, and Portuguese) or  indirect (like the British), did 
not give rise to a different system of rule; colonial rule was all the same: rule 
without effective check of legislatures  representative of local interests (21). 
 
Kiwanuka (1970) strongly refutes the notion of differentiated colonial rule.  
According to him, the “British colonial system came to be associated with the philosophy 
[of indirect rule] not so much because the British applied more indirect rule but because 
they talked about [it] more than others” (300).  Cooper also believes that the British and 
French exaggerated the differences in colonial style (221). He argues that there was no 
uniformity of colonialism in Africa and no strictly differentiated style pursued by the 
colonial powers.  Rather, colonialism differed from country to country and even from 
district to district.   
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Turning to the histories of specific colonies raises more questions about the 
veracity of the claim of distinct colonial rule styles.  Fieldhouse (1981) argues that the 
British had both directly and indirectly ruled colonies. He cites Sierra Leone, The 
Gambia, and Mauritius as examples of directly ruled colonies and Nigeria, parts of 
Uganda, Egypt, and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) as examples of indirectly ruled 
colonies.  Howard (1978) argues that the British strongly and “directly” ruled Ghana: 
“despite token representation on local decision-making organs by traditional African 
chiefs and members of the new petty bourgeoisie, the state was a dictatorial power” 
(146).  
The French, in order to circumvent direct administration of colonial territories in 
French Equatorial Africa, decided to “grant concessions to private companies, which 
were granted monopolies in the areas assigned to them” (Easton 1964 79). It was not 
until after World War II, argues Easton, that France was able to gain any discernable 
type of control over these territories. According to Anthony (1991), the French ruled 
parts of Chad indirectly.  After attempting direct rule in the northern regions of Chad 
and failing, the French decided to “respect the independence of traditional Muslim 
institutions” (577).   
The dependency theory framework has also been used to undermine the 
differentiated colonial legacy argument.  While Brett (1973) does acknowledge a 
difference in styles of colonial administration between the British and French, he does 
not believe that there is any significant difference in post-colonial economic 
development based on these different styles. He points out that colonialism introduced 
colonies to market economic systems and, ultimately, created much transnational 
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inequality by forcing colonies to be dependent on external markets and external 
technologies.  
And yet another issue also contradicts the differentiated colonial legacy 
possibility: the commonality of extraction and foreign rule in colonial system of rule 
may prove to be more important for development and more uniformly affected 
development than the purported differences in colonial style. It becomes difficult to 
argue indirect versus direct forms of rule when the more generalized impetus of foreign 
rule is clearly centralized to the metropole and regardless of the nuances of 
administration, final decision-making was made by and ultimate control was vested in 
the colonizing power.   
Putting aside the question of whether there were ever different styles of colonial 
administration for the moment, it is questionable whether any distinction could have 
persisted throughout the considerable evolution of domestic and international attitudes 
regarding colonialism after World War I, during the epoch of Welfare Colonialism in the 
1920s and after, and following both French and British experiences with colonial revolts 
in Asia (e.g., French Indochina, Britain’s India).   
In regards to the long-term goals the British and French held for their colonial 
territories in Africa, beginning in the 1920s, France’s colonial administrators were in 
fact advocating an eventual devolution of power in their colonies and the involvement of 
native peoples in their own governance.  In the 1920s, Albert Sarraut, French cabinet 
member for colonies, expressed France’s desire to “summon the natives progressively 
more and more into the administration of their country” (Arnett 1933 242).  Jules 
Brevie, governor-general of French West Africa, writing in 1932, announced his goal of 
establishing “true native administration with organs of action and discussion, and with 
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clearly defined functions and powers” (240).  He also stated that the goal of assimilation 
in the French African colonies had been abandoned and that “the policy of association 
has been adopted and successfully practiced” (242).   According to Fieldhouse, the 
statements made by administrators such as Sarraut and Brevie were not isolated 
incidents, nor exceptions to the general principals of French colonialism.  He argues 
that the principal of association took over in 1910s and 1920s, especially after the 
publication of Lord Lugard’s The Dual Mandate in 1922, and “[b]y the 1920s professors 
in the Ecole were preaching the virtues of ‘Indirect Rule’ as practiced in the British 
colonies and rationalized by Lord Lugard….” (38).    
Saxe (1958) argues that a change in European attitudes toward colonialism took 
place after World War I.  
After the war [World War I], new and closer economic ties were established 
between France and Great Britain and their respective colonies. The first stirrings 
of what was to become the welfare state, the  abandonment of an open 
international economic system in favor or  economic nationalism, and the onset of 
a world-wide depression combined to draw French and British possessions 
within imperial protective systems (49).   
 
Additionally, Saxe believes that both Britain and France began making gestures in an 
attempt to “atone” for their mistreatment of colonial peoples through development 
projects.  This atonement could have been a response to mounting humanitarian 
concerns worldwide after the First World War.  
Saxe is implicitly referencing what some have referred to as welfare colonialism.  
Welfare colonialism encompasses the practices and attitudes of the colonial powers 
during the last phase of colonialism, prior to decolonization.  During this period (which 
began roughly after the end of World War I), European powers policies emphasized the 
political, economic and social development of the colonies.  In both British and French 
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colonies, the powers vastly expanded the size and scope of their colonial 
administrations.  Educational and social services increased almost uniformly across the 
colonies.  Large-scale farming projects were undertaken in locations such as Kenya (the 
Swynnerton plan), the Sudan (Gezira project), and French West Africa (the Senegal river 
project) (Duignan and Gann 1975 677).   
Young’s (2004) argues that the colonial state, due in part to the dramatic role of 
the state developmental colonialism demanded, was a very large and strong presence in 
Africa.  Young also believed that developmental colonialism or welfare colonialism was 
the predominant theory in the 1920s for the administration of all colonies, and that in 
order for the colonies to be successful, intense investment in education and welfare were 
required. This universal interpretation of the colonial “mandate” dramatically expanded 
the scope and power of the colonial state.  Additionally, Young believes that World Wars 
I and II also increased the scope of the colonial state. The “wartime imperatives of 
controlling the supply of basic primary commodities, especially for the British, led to 
important new forms of state intervention in the economy” (28).  
In addition to international attitudes and norms, and the advent of welfare 
colonialism, other experiences with colonialism, specifically in Asia, could have also 
affected the style of colonial administration.  According to Mamdani (1996), initially 
there was more of a direct style of rule in French colonies.  However, after World War I, 
he asserts that there was a shift to indirect rule and the use of traditional leaders.  He 
argues that British rule followed same path: originally direct then indirect or 
“decentralized despotism”. He believes that both countries’ changes in colonial 
administration were based on their experiences in colonial Asia, having learned that 
indirect rule is more effective. 
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Furthermore, it should be noted that the differential colonial legacy argument is 
based on European institutional typologies and fails to take into account on the ground 
variation and differences both within countries and between countries.  Boone (2003), 
in examining institutional outcomes in post-colonial Africa, argues that theoretical 
models which pinpoint European administrative styles (i.e. direct/indirect distinction) 
fail to explain institutional variation within African countries (i.e., Eastern versus 
Western Nigeria, a British colony) and between African countries (i.e., Senegal and Cote 
d’Ivoire, both former French colonies).  She also believes that European powers were 
forced to deal with exigencies on the ground mandated indirect forms of rule for both 
French and British colonial administrators:  
[W]hat determined the directness of rule was less preconceived  administrative 
doctrine than the success of European colonizers in finding cooperative African 
leaders and authority figures (intermediaries and interlocateurs valables) 
through whom they would effectively govern the regions and localities (16). 
 
To Boone, colonial style was not imposed from the top-down by European philosophies, 
but rather, based upon the challenges posed by individual territories, the leaders of 
these territories, and the pre-existing administrative structures (i.e., kingdoms, tribal 
councils, etc.). 
 Finally, with regards to classifying colonial rule based on indirect and direct 
styles of administration: perhaps this is an oversimplification or too broad of a 
generalization of what really occurred.  Could there be other typologies which would 
better capture the differences between colonies, and furthermore, better help us explain 
the pattern of development in Africa?  Some theories suggested by the literature include 
basing comparisons on the predominant modes of production, settler versus non-settler 
colonies, or manner of decolonization.  Samir Amin (1974) divides colonial rule into 
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three categories: Africa of colonial economy, Africa of concession companies, and Africa 
of labor reserves.  Another interesting difference could be settler versus non-settler 
colonies.  Kenya (British), South Africa (British), and Algeria (French) are all examples 
of settler colonies, or colonies in which there was/is a substantial European settler 
presence.   
Additionally, could the manner or method of decolonization affect subsequent 
development? In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon posited that only through a genuine 
violent struggle for independence would people be freed from the psychological shackles 
of colonial oppression and able to govern themselves (1961).  All of these are different 
typological possibilities which transcend the British/French distinction and give 
credence to the theory that there was no significant or long-lasting difference between 
British and French rule in Africa.  The anecdotal and theoretical arguments are 
compelling.  However, few empirical tests of this theory have been conducted.  It is 
necessary to now empirically examine this hypothesis in order to add another dimension 
to the discussion.  
 
Data Analysis 
This paper seeks to test the hypothesis that there is a significant difference 
between British and French economic and political “legacies” using data for 43 African 
countries.  The countries included in the dataset are located in both North Africa and 
sub-Saharan Africa.  Some researchers prefer to study sub-Saharan African in isolation 
from North Africa due to the differences in natural resource endowment (most North 
African countries are oil-exporting countries) and the influence of Islam on North 
Africa.  However, this paper analyzes both North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa together 
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as both regions have similar histories with colonialism, several sub-Saharan countries 
are also oil-exporting countries (Nigeria, Sudan, Chad, and Angola, to name a few), and 
Islam is rather influential in many sub-Saharan countries.8   
Smaller, island countries such as Mauritius, Comoros or Sao Tome and Principe, 
for example, are not included in the dataset.  This is due to the fact that smaller, less 
populated island countries such as these grow significantly differently and face different 
challenges than the countries situated in continental Africa.  For example, smaller 
economies such as these are unable to take economic advantage of economies of scale 
and, to combat the problem, tend to rely on trade heavily.  The United Nations has 
recognized the different economic situations facing smaller island countries, and has in 
fact, mandated its Division for Sustainable Development to oversee the implementation 
of the Barbados Program of Action (adopted in 1994), which offers specific policy 
recommendation for what it refers to as Small Island Developing States, or SIDS.  
 Data has been collected from independence (or 1960, for those countries whose 
independence was secured/obtained/granted/prior to 1960) until 1982.  Countries such 
as Eritrea and Namibia, which did not become independent states until the 1990s are 
omitted from the dataset.  Countries that obtained their independence prior to the 
1960s are included as a control group to mediate against larger continental trends in 
development.  The median first year of data collection for this data set is 1960 and the 
average or mean year is 1963.  This time period, which covers an average span of 19 
years, was selected to capture postcolonial development and to ensure that international 
shocks such as the oil shocks of the 1970s were uniformly captured for all countries.  
This time period, while selected partially based on issues of data availability, should be 
                                                 
8 For more information on the influence of Islam in South Africa see Quinn and Quinn (2003).  
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long enough to capture country-level and continental trends in economic and political 
development. A complete list of country cases with their years this dataset includes can 
be found in Appendix A.  Data was compiled from multiple sources.  These sources can 
be found in Appendix B.  
The decision to only collect data through 1982 was made in an attempt to isolate 
the immediate effects of colonialism.  Although Young suggests that a colonial legacy 
persisted only through 1989, in order to test this, data would need to be collected from 
independence through at least the mid to late 1990s.  Unfortunately at this time, the 
availability of reliable data for GDP growth prevents the explicit testing of Young’s 
theory.    
In order to test the differential colonial legacy hypothesis, I examined several 
different measures of economic and political development: GDP per capita for the first 
year of independence (or 1960) to measure immediate post-colonial development levels; 
average GDP per capita over the time period in question; average growth in GDP per 
capita; average Polity scores; a few of the component measures of Polity (namely, 
competitiveness of executive recruitment, regulation of participation, and 
competitiveness of participation); and several measures of violence and conflict. I then 
compared the means of former British and former French colonies on each of these 
measures and tested them using T-tests to determine if the differences are significant.  
After examining the results of bivariate analyses, I then turn to the results of the 
regression analyses.  
There appears to be very little difference between former British and former 
French colonies with respect to economic development (See Table 1; next page).  The 
difference between the baseline GDP per capita for former British and former French 
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colonies is minute ($946.29 for former British colonies, $971.29 for former French 
colonies). Looking at average GDP per capita for the first 20 or so years of 
independence, GDP per capita for former British colonies in Africa averaged $1205.28; 
GDP per capita for former French colonies was only slightly higher at $1344.41.  The 
difference between average GDP growth for former British and former French colonies 
is very small. Former British colonies enjoyed, on average, 4.72% GDP growth from 
independence until 1982.  Former French colonies enjoyed, on average, 4.34% growth.  
All other African countries in the sample (i.e., former Portuguese colonies, former 
Belgium colonies, those with no colonial history), however, have experienced what 
appears to be significantly less economic development than both former British and 
French colonies.  The other African countries averaged $742.69 GDP per capita and 
2.8% GDP growth.  However, one-way ANOVA tests, which will be discussed in further 
detail below, indicate that there is no significant difference between these three 
groupings of former colonies (See Table 4; page 55).  
Table 1: 
Economic Development Indicators 
  
British 
 
 
French 
 
 
Other 
Average Baseline 
GDP per capita 
(First Year of 
Independence) 
$946.29 
(N=17) 
$971.29 
(N=17) 
$728.44 
(N=9) 
Average GDP 
Growth:1960-1982 
(Percent) 
4.72% 
(N=15) 
4.34% 
(N=16) 
2.80% 
(N=9) 
Average GDP per 
capita:1960-1982 
(US 1980 dollars) 
$1205.28 
(N=17) 
$1344.41 
(N=17) 
$742.69 
(N=9) 
 
Looking at yearly changes in GDP per capita from 1960 to 1982, we see that, for the 
most part, former British and former French colonies levels’ track each other. As Graph 
1 indicates (next page), prior to 1967, there appears to be variation in GDP per capita 
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between former British and former French colonies. Former British colonies 
experienced a spike in GDP per capita in 1961 and a downward trend thereafter.  
However, after 1967, GDP per capita for both groups of countries appear to follow the 
same general upward trend.  
Graph 1: 
GDP Per Capita: 1960-1982
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Turning to average Polity scores, there does seem to be some difference between 
former colonies (See Table 2; next page). Former British colonies averaged -2.26 Polity 
scores, whereas former French colonies averaged -6.15 and all others averaged -6.41.  As 
Polity is a composite measure of factors relating to democracy and authoritarianism, 
breaking down Polity and examining some of its components of authority characteristics 
may provide us with a better understanding of the meaning or significance of this 
difference.  Comparing the competitiveness of executive recruitment, regulation of 
participation, and competitiveness of participation between former British and former 
French colonies, we find that former British colonies scored slightly higher on 
competitiveness of executive recruitment (1.66 for former British colonies compared to 
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.84 for former French colonies) and competitiveness of participation (1.93 for former 
British colonies compared to 1.31 for former French colonies).  Former French colonies 
scored higher on the regulation of participation (3.88 for former French colonies 
compared to 3.68 for former British colonies).  However, as these component measures 
range on a scale of 0 to 10, these differences appear to be slight.  
Table 2: 
Political Development Indicators 
Averages from 1960 -1982  
  
British 
 
 
French 
 
 
Other 
Polity Score 
(-10 to 10) 
-2.26 
(N=17) 
-6.15 
(N=17) 
-6.41 
(N=10) 
  A. Competitiveness 
of Executive 
Recruitment 
(0-10) 
1.66 
(N=16) 
.84 
(N=17) 
.81 
(N=10) 
  B. Regulation of 
Participation 
(0-10) 
3.68 
(N=16) 
3.88 
(N=17) 
3.80 
(N=10) 
  C. Competitiveness 
of Participation 
(0-10) 
1.93 
(N=16) 
1.31 
(N=17) 
1.23 
(N=10) 
 
Additionally, examining the yearly trends for Polity suggests that differentiated colonial 
legacy has had little impact on democratization in Africa (See Graph 2; next page).  
Polity scores for former British and former French colonies mirror each other almost 
perfectly, which suggests a larger trend in democratization affecting both sets of 
colonies rather uniformly.  
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Graph 2: 
Polity: 1960-1982
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In order to examine political legitimacy and political institutionalization—two other 
indicators of political development—various measures of political violence have been 
analyzed9 (See Table 3; next page).  Looking at total number of assassinations, 
government crises, riots, revolutions, anti-government demonstrations, coup d’etats, 
and major constitutional changes, there appears to be no significant difference between 
former British and former French colonies.  The total numbers are very close for both 
groups of African countries.  However, it is interesting that all other African countries 
(i.e., former Portuguese colonies, former Belgian colonies, independent countries, etc.) 
do have significantly higher levels of political violence, specifically with regards to riots 
(12.57 for all other African countries compared to approximately 3.5 total riots for 
former British and former French colonies) and anti-government demonstrations (5.2 
for all other African countries compared to approximately 2 total anti-government 
demonstrations for former British and former French colonies).   
                                                 
9Sources for and definitions of political development can be found in Appendix B.  
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Table 3: 
Political Development Indicators 
Total Number of Incidences from 1960 -1982  
  
British 
 
 
French 
 
 
Other 
Assassinations of 
Prominent Political 
Leaders 
1.4 
(N=17) 
.88 
(N=17) 
2.6 
(N=10) 
General Strikes .35 
(N=17) 
.41 
(N=17) 
.8 
(N=10) 
Government Crises 1.88 
(N=17) 
2.06 
(N=17) 
3.14 
(N=10) 
Riots 3.53 
(N=17) 
3.65 
(N=17) 
12.57 
(N=10) 
Revolutions 3.18 
(N=17) 
4.0 
(N=17) 
5.0 
(N=10) 
Anti-Government 
Demonstrations 
1.76 
(N=17) 
2.12 
(N=17) 
5.2 
(N=10) 
Coup d’etats 1.18 
(N=17) 
1.18 
(N=17) 
1.1 
(N=10) 
Major Constitutional 
Changes 
4.0 
(N=17) 
3.77 
(N=17) 
3.1 
(N=10) 
Arthur Banks Weighted 
Conflict Index 
21041 
(N=17) 
22875 
(N=17) 
44009 
(N=10) 
 
Looking at yearly data for assassinations, a measure of political legitimacy, there does 
not appear to be any general trend driving assassinations or (Graph 3). 
Graph 3: 
Assasinations: 1960-1982
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In order to determine the statistical significance of these measures, I ran simple 
Difference of Means Tests.  As this is a relatively small sample of cases, T-tests are the 
most appropriate test (specifically two-sample T-tests with equal variance).  The results 
of the T-tests (See Table 4; next page ) indicate that there are no significant differences 
between former British and former French colonies on any of the economic 
development measures, but that there is a significant difference between the former 
colonies for a few of the political development measures.  The difference between 
average Polity scores of former British and all other former colonies is significant at the 
.05 level.  This test suggests that former British colonies have experienced significantly 
different (and better) average Polity scores than the other countries in the sample.  
However, we must take into consideration the fact that the differences are between 
shades or levels of authoritarianism, and that former British colonies were not 
necessarily more democratic during this time period, but less authoritarian.  This same 
caveat must be applied when analyzing the differences between the countries’ scores on 
the Polity components. Former British colonies are significantly more competitive with 
regards to executive recruitment (at the .001 level) and participation (at the .05 level) 
than former French colonies, but we must remember that the observed differences are 
still considerably undemocratic (1.66 versus .84 for competitiveness of executive 
recruitment and 1.93 versus 1.31 for competitiveness of participation on a 0 to 10 scale).  
Furthermore, there are absolutely no significant differences between former British and 
former French colonies with regards to political violence.  In analyzing seven different 
measures of political violence, not a single one of these are significantly different 
between former British and former French colonies. 
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As countries in the other category—those African countries that were neither 
former British nor former French colonies—appear to be experiencing significantly 
different, and generally lower, levels of development, one-way ANOVA tests were run to 
compare all three categories and determine if significant differences existed between the 
three.  Interestingly enough, only those variables that were reported as being 
significantly different between former British and former French colonies were again 
reported as significant in the ANOVA tests: Polity and two of the components of Polity. 
Table 4: 
Difference of Means Tests 
 Two-sample T-
test: British vs. 
Non-British 
Former 
Colonies 
Two-sample T-
test: French vs. 
Non-French  
Former Colonies 
One-way ANOVA 
Test: British, 
French, and Other 
Baseline GDP 
(GDP for first year of 
independence) 
t= -.3567 t=-.6081 F=.582 
 
GDP Growth t=-1.0360 t=-.4086 F=1.322 
Average GDP per capita t=-.2830 t=-1.2468 F=1.587 
Polity Score t=-3.061** t=1.6890 F=8.306*** 
  A. Competitiveness of 
Executive Recruitment 
(0-10) 
t=-4.6352*** t=2.4208** F=10.491*** 
  B. Regulation of 
Participation (0-10) 
t=1.3383 t=-1.23 F=1.008 
C. Competitiveness of 
Participation (0-10) 
t=-2.8283** t=1.4327 F=3.953** 
Assassinations of 
Prominent Political 
Leaders 
t=.1343 t=1.2415 F=1.484 
Government Crises t=.4657 t=.1101 F=239 
Riots t=.5952 t=.5432 F=.884 
Revolutions t=.9578 t=-.1176 F=.643 
Anti-Government 
Demonstrations 
t=.7361 t=.4510 F=.976 
Coup d’etats t=-.0663 t=-.0663 F=.012 
Major Constitutional 
Changes 
t=-.7009 t=-.1419 F=.523 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
** Significant at the .05 level 
* Significant at the .01 level 
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Regression Analysis 
Averages of the data, which covers a time period of almost 20 years, were used in 
a simple OLS regression.  The choice to use averages instead of individual years in a 
time series format was based on their use in several other studies on African 
development.  Researchers such as Easterly and Levine (1997), Sachs and Warner (1997) 
and Englebert (2001) have also opted to use averages over time (either for the entire 
time period in question or decade by decade) instead of delineated time series data.  
This may be based on part on the ease of using single data points in OLS regression, the 
difficulty of obtaining complete and reliable time series data, and the difficulty of 
managing time series data in regression analysis.   
It is the author’s belief that there is no marked difference between development 
in former British colonies and former French colonies.  
Therefore the first hypothesis tested in this paper is as follows:  
 
H1: There is no relationship between former colonial power and post-colonial 
economic growth.  
 
The alternative hypothesis would be that there is a relationship between former colonial 
power and post-colonial economic growth.  
The model suggested by the literature to test H1 is as follows: 
 
Economic growth = β + Population + Rural Population + Literacy Rate + 
Landlocked Status + Tropical Climate + Amount of Trade + Highly Valuable 
Natural Resources + Foreign Direct Investment + International aid + Polity 
+Conflict+ British Dummy+ µ 
 
The dependent variable is growth in GDP per capita. North and Thomas (1973) 
convincingly argue that growth in GDP per capita is a more appropriate measure of 
economic growth than GDP growth as “[t]rue economic growth thus implies that the 
total income of society must increase more rapidly than population” (1).  Additionally, 
 56
treating economic growth as an interval measure allows for more specific and accurate 
econometric analysis.  
The second hypothesis tested is: 
 
H2: There is no relationship between former colonial power and post-colonial 
political development. 
 
The alternative hypothesis would be that there is a relationship between former colonial 
power and post-colonial economic growth.  The model suggested by the literature to test 
H2 is as follows: 
Political development = β + Ethno-linguistic fractionalization + GDP growth + 
British dummy + Literacy Rate + Natural Resources + µ 
  
The dependent variables used are: Polity score, a complex measurement for regime type, 
which ranges from -10 for pure autocracy to 10 for pure democracy (the 20-point range 
gives researchers the ability to treat it as an interval level variable with meaningful 
values for each score); the components of polity including the competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, the regulation of participation, and the competitiveness of 
participation; and several measures of political violence.  Polity and its components are 
used to measure democratization, while political violence and conflict (assassinations, 
riots, coups, revolutions, etc.) are measures of institutionalization and/or legitimation of 
the political system.   
The hypotheses tested here are an attempt to prove a null hypothesis: that there 
is no significant difference between the growth and development of former French and 
former British colonies.  This is a very difficult task as the statistical tests used here may 
indicate support for a false positive (that there is no significant difference) if careful 
attention is not paid to creating a thorough and (hopefully) exhaustive list of controls 
and included variables.  Care has been taken in assembling as thorough a theoretical list 
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of variables as possible.  These variables are wholly informed by the literature and 
include those variables believed to be most important in affecting development.  
 Prior to examining the results of the regression analysis, one salient 
methodological concern needs to be addressed.  Of particular importance to those who 
study African politics is the dearth of available data.  Specifically, in the immediate post-
colonial years (1960s and early 1970s) many variables of interest are simply not 
available, and when available, the quality may be questionable.  This is not to say there 
are no available data on Africa; however those variables which are difficult to collect 
such as health and education statistics, or micro-level economic statistics, are either not 
available at this time, or if available, sporadic and unreliable.  This is due to the more 
recent, comparatively speaking, independence of most African countries and their 
relative underdevelopment.  This poses a real problem for statistical regressions as 
missing or incomplete data reduces the generalizability and reliability of regression 
results.  Specifically, excessive missing data can cause cases to drop out of statistical 
regressions.  This is commonplace for statistical analyses of African phenomena.  
 Sachs and Warner’s 1997 article entitled “Sources of Slow Growth in African 
Economies” provides a good example of this problem.  Although generalizing to most of 
Africa with their results regarding the sources of economic underdevelopment or “slow 
growth,” as they refer to it, they include only 23 African countries in their regression 
analysis.  This is due to missing data for the remaining African countries.  In order to 
test the veracity of their claims for the causes of slow growth, they replace the missing 
variables for the countries that dropped out of their model with the averages for all 
other African countries for which data is available.  From this, they “quasi-predict” 
 58
growth rates and compare them to known growth rates, where they find that the model 
is over-predicting economic growth.   
 There are a few issues to take up with their methodology. First, replacing missing 
data with averages of African growth for all other countries included in the regression 
makes a rather large assumption regarding the true nature of the missing data. There is 
no way to tell if these 23 countries are consistent with the averages of the other 23 
countries. It could be the case that these countries may all have worse or lower values 
for the missing variables.  Second, it may not be a random falling out of cases, in which 
case their model would suffer from selection bias and their results would not be 
generalizable outside of the 23 cases that they are able to include in their model.  After 
explicitly acknowledging their problems with missing data, they conclude that this 
should not detract from the generalizability of their findings.   
 In this paper, and unlike Sachs and Warner, I chose to err on the side of caution.  
Therefore, due to issues of data availability, I present two models of economic growth. 
The first includes all variables of interest, which due to missing data, reduces the 
number of countries analyzed from 43 to 29.  Then, I present a model which uses only 
variables for which the data is available. I compare the results of these two models, but 
do not feel as though the findings are generalizable. These findings are limited by the 
data and I am skeptical of their accuracy.   
 For the regression examining political development, the data are equally suspect.  
In fact, a regression that includes all 43 countries would include only one of the five 
independent variables (ethno-linguistic fragmentation).  Due to this fact, only the 
regression including all independent variables is presented.  Thus, the same caveats 
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expressed earlier are still relevant: these findings are limited by the data and I am 
skeptical of their accuracy and generalizability.  
Economic Development 
            The results of the first model of economic growth, which includes all variables of 
interest, are presented in Table 5 (next page).  This model has a relatively high adjusted 
R-squared (.61), but the number of countries is relatively low (29 of 43). Illiteracy, 
tropical climate, and the presence of highly valuable natural resources are all negatively 
related to economic growth, although tropical climate and the presence of highly 
valuable natural resources are only marginally statistically significant (at the .10 level).  
These findings and the negative direction of their relationship to economic growth are 
not surprising and are consistent with the findings of many other researchers.  Total 
population, amount of trade and percent of rural population are all significant and 
positively related to economic growth, although total population is only marginally 
significant (at the .10 level).   
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Table 5: 
Economic Development Regressions 
OLS Regression Models:             
                                                     
Model 1: 
All variables 
Model 2: 
All Data 
Model 3: 
All Data 
(with Botswana 
dummy) 
Total Population 
   (Natural Log) 
Rural Population 
   (Squared) 
Illiteracy 
Landlocked Status 
Tropical Climate 
Amount of Trade 
Natural Resources  
   (Natural Log) 
International Aid 
FDI 
Polity  
   (Squared) 
Conflict 
   (Natural Log) 
British Dummy 
Botswana Dummy 
 
1.01 a 
 
.0008*** 
 
-.06** 
-1.47 
-2.75 a 
.077** 
-1.84 a 
 
.36 
.099 
.02 
 
-.66 
 
.57 
--B 
-1.34 
 
-.00005 
 
--B  
-.07 
-1.90 
--B  
--B  
 
--B  
--B 
.02 
 
-2.92*** 
 
1.11 
--B 
.09 
 
-.00009 
 
--B  
-.51 
-1.46 
--B  
--B 
 
--B 
--B 
.013 
 
-2.95*** 
 
.48 
8.29*** 
Adj. R2  
N                                                                      
.61 
29 
.34 
40 
.53 
40 
Note: a p < .10, * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p< .001: Cell entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. 
B Variable was not included in the model 
 
 
That trade and population size are positively related to economic growth is consistent 
with much of the literature; however, the positive directions of rural population percent 
is surprising.  Much of the literature suggests rural population, a proxy measure for 
industrialization and urbanization, should be negatively related to growth as larger rural 
populations indicate a large reliance on agricultural production and a dispersed 
population which may hinder market-related economic activities.  However, the 
coefficient for this variable is very small, which indicates that the impact of rural 
population, although significant, is very small.  
 The results of Model 2, which only includes variables for which data is available 
for nearly all countries in the sample, are presented in Table 3 alongside the results for 
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Model 1.   In this model, only one variable is significant: conflict.  It is statistically 
significantly (at the .01 level) and negatively related to economic growth.  When I ran 
diagnostics to check the accuracy of the model, I found that the model did not fit at all 
one specific country: Botswana.  The difference between Model 2’s predicted GDP 
growth and actual GDP growth for Botswana was significantly off (predicted 6.59% 
versus actual growth of 13.36%).  This is not surprising as other research, specifically 
that of Acemoglu et al. (2003), has found Botswana to be an outlier.  I decided to 
include a dummy variable in the regression for Botswana (see Model 3 in Table 3).  The 
inclusion of this variable, which is statistically significant at the .001 level, increased the 
adjusted R-squared from .34 (for Model 2) to .53 (for Model 3), reinforcing my belief 
that it is a very unusual and important case.  Being Botswana (which, of course only one 
country is) increases GDP growth by 8.29 percent.  This makes sense considering 
Botswana’s exceptional history of economic growth and political stability.  It is a unique 
case. According to Acemoglu et al., Botswana’s consistent economic growth over the 
past 35 years has outpaced not only every other African country, but also every other 
country in the world (80). They attribute this to a unique set of institutions, especially 
those concerning the protection of property rights, as enabling the country to pursue 
and implement good and sound economic policy.   
 Comparing the models, we find that the variables that are significant in Model 1 
are not significant in Model 2, and vice versa. Depending on how the model is 
structured (either with all variables believed to be relevant or with only available data), 
we see drastically different and inconsistent results.  Not one variable is significant in 
both, although, interestingly enough, the British dummy is not significant in either.  But 
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neither is Polity, a variable that most believe should be correlated (either positively or 
negatively).  
Political Development  
 The distribution and variation of Polity has posed a large problem for regression 
analysis.  The observed values for this variable range from -9 to 7.9 but have an average 
score of -5.02 and a Standard Deviation of 4.1, meaning that there is very little variation 
in this variable.  Only two countries, Botswana and The Gambia, have average Polity 
scores that are considered democratic; the rest are decidedly autocratic during the 
period of interest.  As there is little to no meaningful variation in Polity, I was unable to 
run a regression using Polity.  This lack of variation, however, implies that any colonial 
legacy affecting political development does not influence regime type (i.e., democracy 
versus autocracy).  There is also very little variation in the components of Polity.  The 
range for the various components runs from 0 to 10.  However, when examining only 
African countries, the scores for competitiveness of executive recruitment range from 0 
to 3.  The scores for regulation of participation range from 2 to 4.67.  The scores for 
competitiveness or participation range from .61 to 4.9.  The lack of variation in these 
variables makes it unwise to use them in regression analysis.  Thus, I was unable to test 
democratization and an indicator of political development. The lack of variability in 
regime type also highlights an important issue relevant to African research: the need for 
better measures of political development. Democratization, as has been used by 
countless researchers as a quantitative measure of political development, has very little 
applicability in the African case until the 1990s. This is not to say that political 
development was not occurring, just that traditional measures as used by social 
scientists who study other regions may not be the most appropriate for Africa.   
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 It is possible to examine legitimacy of the political system as a measure of 
political development; however, the results are suspect and inconclusive.  Table 6 
reports the results of the regression using total number of assassinations as the 
dependent variable. It must be noted that cases are again dropping out; the N has 
dropped from 43 African countries to 32 African countries. Only one variable, the 
amount of natural resources present, is significant, and only marginally so (at the .10 
level).  Additionally, the R-squared is very low (.19), indicating that this model is doing a 
very poor job of explaining the variation in the dependent variable.  
Table 6: 
Political Development Regressions  
(with Robust Standard Errors) 
OLS Regression Models: 
 
Model: 
Number of 
Assassinations as 
Dependent Variable 
(natural log) 
Ethno-linguistic Fragmentation 
(squared) 
GDP growth 
British Dummy 
Literacy Rate 
Natural Resource Measure 
(natural log) 
 
.123 
 
-.056 
.107 
-.009 
-.237 a 
R2                                                                         
N 
.19 
32 
Note: a p < .10, * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p< .001: Cell entries 
are unstandardized regression coefficients. 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
 These findings suggest: 1) None of the development models are capturing the 
true nature of development in Africa, either due to missing data or missing variables, 
both of which are very important for the reliability of the model; 2) Based on the lack of 
variation in regime type over the time period in question, the difference between British 
and French colonial leadership, if it did exist, has had little or no impact on post-
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colonial regime type; 3) Researchers do not yet understand the exact nature of the 
relationship between political development and economic development in Africa; 4) and 
that the models are most likely misspecified.  This could be due to missing data, missing 
variables, or the wrong structural form.  Specifically, this model should be tested using 
simultaneous equations, which take into account the interdependent relationship 
between economic development and political development. However, this it not possible 
at this time due to problems with of data availability and reliability and the problems 
related to conceptualizing and measuring political development.  
 The literature offers compelling anecdotal and theoretical reasons why we should 
believe that the direct/indirect typology is oversimplified: 1) the British and the French 
used both direct and indirect forms of rule in many of their colonies; 2) the existence of 
welfare colonialism and other ideological normative shifts may have overridden any 
original stylistic differences.  Additionally, difference of means tests indicate that there 
have been no significant differences between former British and former French colonies 
with respect to economic growth and political legitimacy/institutionalization, one aspect 
of political development. Additional tests indicate that there were no significant 
differences between both former British and former French colonies and all other 
African countries.  Also, economic growth and democratization both appear to follow 
larger trends as the yearly data indicates that these measures track each other over time.   
 Difference of means tests indicate that political development as measured 
through Polity and its components may have occurred differently in former British and 
former French colonies (and that “other” countries experienced significantly different 
political development than both former British and former French colonies), but it must 
be kept in mind that the difference we are speaking of refer to shades of 
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authoritarianism.  Additionally, democratization, which Polity and its components 
measures, may not be the most appropriate measure of political development, as 
discussed earlier. Polity measures democratization, more or less, and does not capture 
other indicators of political development, such as better or more frequent penetration of 
society by the state, increased state capacity, or state legitimacy in the eyes of the 
citizenry.  During the time period of question, and prior to the 1990s trend of 
democratization, it is obvious that there was little variation in regime type across the 
African continent.  We should be hesitant, however, to interpret this to mean there was 
no political development.  Using a different measure of political development might 
reveal that there was in fact variation in political development.  Perhaps research should 
focus on discovering a better, more appropriate way of measuring political development 
in developing countries.  Admittedly, this will prove a challenging task as evidenced by 
the current lack of any such variable measuring these concepts.  But that is not to say 
that it can not or should not be done.   
 There are some promising new studies in this field that are attempting to create a 
new measure of political development.  Hyden et al. (2004) represent one such attempt.  
According to them, regime type and democratization are inadequate indicators of 
political development as they are “so heavily loaded with normative assumptions and 
preferences that political issues are analyzed from a narrow perspective” (1).  Instead, 
they believe governance, a six-part variable which includes measures for civil society, 
political society, government, bureaucracy, economic society, and the judiciary, to be a 
more comprehensive and accurate measure of political development.  In order to 
measure their governance variable, they conducted interviews with a cross-section of 
“well-informed persons” in each of the six areas mentioned above in 16 different 
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countries.  They interviewed both state and non-state actors in order to ensure a less 
biased result.  Theirs, they fully admit, is a preliminary step at establishing a new 
indicator of political development, but it is an example of researchers innovating and 
attempting to obtain a better measure of political development.  There is some progress 
being made here, and I hope that this trend will continue.This study has highlighted 
some of the difficulties of quantitatively studying Africa: namely, lack of available and 
reliable data, the methodological problems inherent in missing data, and (as mentioned 
above) the possible inappropriateness of a common measure of political development.  
A top priority for researchers should be to collect better and more complete data on 
Africa.  While admittedly a daunting challenge, it is vital that this data is made 
accessible to those who wish to empirically study Africa. Without it, future research will 
remain unreliable and subject to serious methodological criticism.  Additionally, 
attempts should continue to be made to construct better indicators of political 
development (and many other social phenomena) that better describe and represent the 
African experience in order to facilitate the exploration of African politics.  
 The data needed to further test the differential colonial legacy hypothesis with 
regression analysis is not readily available or reliable, making it impossible to 
completely discount the possible influence of colonial administrative style on post-
colonial development.  That having been said, it is very interesting to note that 
development trends are tracking each other, giving some credence to the theory that 
colonialism, in general, has uniformly affected post-colonial development in Africa.  
Additionally, this begs the question whether these rather uniform development trends 
also support dependency theory.  We must turn now to the larger and more important 
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question facing the African continent: how to engender development in the face of these 
larger continental trends?  
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Appendix A: List of Countries and Years Included 
Algeria (1962-1982) 
Angola (1975-1982) 
Benin (1960-1982) 
Botswana (1966-1982) 
Burkina Faso (1960-1982) 
Burundi (1962-1982) 
Cameroon (1960-1982) 
Central African Republic 
(1960-1982) 
Chad (1960-1982) 
Congo-Brazzaville (1960-
1982) 
Congo-Kinshasa (1960-
1982) 
Cote D’ Ivoire (1960-1982) 
Egypt (1960-1982) 
Ethiopia (1960-1982) 
 
Gabon (1960-1982) 
The Gambia (1965-1982) 
Ghana (1960-1982) 
Guinea (1960-1982) 
Guinea-Bissau (1974-
1982) 
Kenya (1963-1982) 
Lesotho (1966-1982) 
Liberia (1960-1982) 
Libya (1960-1982) 
Madagascar (1960-1982) 
Malawi (1964-1982) 
Mali (1960-1982) 
Mauritania (1960-1982) 
Morocco (1960-1982) 
Mozambique (1975-1982) 
Niger (1960-1982) 
 
Nigeria (1960-1982) 
Rwanda (1961-1982) 
Senegal (1960-1982) 
Sierra Leone (1961-1982) 
Somalia (1960-1982) 
South Africa (1960-1982) 
Sudan (1960-1982) 
Tanzania (1961-1982) 
Togo (1960-1982) 
Tunisia (1960-1982) 
Uganda (1962-1982) 
Zambia (1964-1982) 
Zimbabwe (1980-1982) 
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Appendix B: List of Variables, Definitions, and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
GDP growth 
 
 
 
 
Total Population 
 
 
Rural Population 
 
 
 
Illiteracy 
 
 
 
Landlocked Status 
 
 
 
 
Tropical Climate 
 
 
 
 
Amount of Trade 
 
 
 
Natural Resources 
 
 
 
International Aid 
 
 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
 
Percent growth in Gross 
Domestic Product per 
capita from one year to 
the next 
 
Country’s total population 
(Natural Log) 
 
Percent of population 
considered living in rural 
areas (Squared) 
 
Percent of population, 
above age of 15, who can 
not read or write 
 
Dummy variable coded 1 
for countries that are 
landlocked, 0 for those 
that are not 
 
Approximate percent of 
country’s land area that is 
subject to a tropical 
climate 
 
Sum of exports and 
imports measured as a 
percent of GDP 
 
Share of exports of 
primary products in GNP 
in 1970 (Natural Log) 
 
Official Development 
Assistance and outside aid 
received by country 
measured per capita 
 
Foreign direct investment 
net flows as a percent of 
GDP 
 
Alesina, Ozler, Roubini 
and Swagel (1996) 
 
 
 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
(2001) 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
(2001) 
 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
(2001) 
 
Self-constructed 
 
 
 
 
Sachs and Warner (1997) 
 
 
 
 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
(2001) 
 
Sachs and Warner (1997) 
 
 
 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
(2001) 
 
 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
(2001) 
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Polity 
 
 
 
 
 
  A. Competitiveness of      
Executive Recruitment 
  B. Regulation of 
Participation 
  C. Competitiveness of 
Participation 
 
Conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
British Dummy 
 
 
 
 
Botswana Dummy 
 
 
 
Assassinations 
 
 
 
Government Crises 
 
 
 
Riots 
 
 
 
Revolutions 
 
 
 
 
Measure of political 
regime type ranging from 
-10 (pure autocracy) to 10 
(pure democracy) 
(Squared) 
 
Measures ranging from 0 
to 10.  
 
 
 
 
 
Sum of average magnitude 
(ranging from 0 for none 
and 4 for highest) of 
adverse regime change, 
ethnic conflict and 
revolution  
(Natural Log) 
 
Dummy variable coded 1 
for all former British 
colonies and 0 for all 
other countries 
 
Dummy variable coded 1 
for Botswana and 0 for all 
other countries 
 
Total number of 
Assassinations 
 
 
Total number of 
Government Crises 
 
 
Total number of riots 
 
 
 
Total number of 
revolutions 
 
 
 
Polity IV Dataset 
 
 
 
 
 
Polity IV Dataset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlates of War Dataset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-constructed 
 
 
 
 
Self-constructed 
 
 
 
Arthur Banks Cross-
national Time Series Data 
(2001) 
 
Arthur Banks Cross-
national Time Series Data 
(2001) 
 
Arthur Banks Cross-
national Time Series Data 
(2001) 
 
Arthur Banks Cross-
national Time Series Data 
(2001) 
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Anti-government 
Demonstrations 
 
 
Coup d’etats 
 
 
 
Major Constitutional 
Changes 
Total number of Anti-
government 
demonstrations 
 
Total number of Coup 
d’etats 
 
 
Total number of major 
constitutional changes 
Arthur Banks Cross-
national Time Series Data 
(2001) 
 
Arthur Banks Cross-
national Time Series Data 
(2001) 
 
Arthur Banks Cross-
national Time Series Data 
(2001) 
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